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I like the approach to the topic especially with the historical context, but some of the author’s statements/conclusions make me question their historical accuracy or personal bias.
Here’s the best example:
In view of the foregoing, we, the undersigned, respectfully petition: first, that you exercise your power as Commander-in-Chief, to rule that the United States shall not resort to the use of atomic bombs in this war unless the terms which will be imposed upon Japan have been made public in detail and Japan knowing these terms has refused to surrender; second, that in such an event the question whether or not to use atomic bombs be decided by you in the light of the consideration presented in this petition as well as all the other moral responsibilities which are involved.
President Truman declined to adopt this recommendation.
The Potsdam Declaration delivered on July 26, 1945 seems to meet nearly all of what the scientists requested. This includes the demand from the Allies for a complete and unconditional surrender of Japan, and the consequence of rejecting this demand being “prompt and utter destruction.” On July 28, 1945, Japan formally rejected the Potsdam Declaration.
August 6, 1945, the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima.
I’m not sure what the author would consider “adopting this recommendation” considering the specifics included in the Potsdam Declaration.
I’m not sure (literally not sure!) if the Postdam Declaration meets the spirit of the Franck Report and Szilard Petition. One aspect is this:
If such public announcement gave assurance to the Japanese that they could look forward to a life devoted to peaceful pursuit in their homeland and if Japan still refused to surrender, our nation might then, in certain circumstances, find itself forced to resort to the use of atomic bombs.
One the one hand, the Potsdam Declaration asks for unconditional surrender. But I don’t think that’s disqualifying on its own and it also includes passages like this, which I think you could reasonably argue do meet the criteria laid out above:
the Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives
Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to rearm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.
But there’s another part of both the Franck report and the Szilard Petition: They were concerned that once nuclear weapons were used, it was inevitable that other nations would develop them, e.g. this part:
If after the war a situation is allowed to develop in the world which permits rival powers to be in uncontrolled possession of these new means of destruction, the cities of the United States as well as the cities of other nations will be in continuous danger of sudden annihilation.
Though I suppose they only urge that Truman to consider these issues, and maybe he did.
But there’s another part of both the Franck report and the Szilard Petition: They were concerned that once nuclear weapons were used, it was inevitable that other nations would develop them, e.g. this part:
If after the war a situation is allowed to develop in the world which permits rival powers to be in uncontrolled possession of these new means of destruction, the cities of the United States as well as the cities of other nations will be in continuous danger of sudden annihilation.
That is mostly a sentiment repeated from the original Einstein–Szilárd letter.
Where I would have really appreciated the author go is that Szilárd is likely the cause for nuclear weapons to exist as we know them. He presumed that Nazi Germany was developing nuclear weapons and took actions to encourage the USA to create them first. History shows us that Nazi’s weren’t as smart and instead went down the path of developing their version of the technology for nuclear power plants, not bombs.
There was no risk of the powers of WWII of either side building atomic bombs until Szilárd’s actions put us on a course for their creation.