

The article claims that one of the refining units was damaged, but unfortunately doesn’t give information about which parts of it were hit. Could be pipes, could be a fractioning tower.


The article claims that one of the refining units was damaged, but unfortunately doesn’t give information about which parts of it were hit. Could be pipes, could be a fractioning tower.


Maybe the drone is too slow? Like how an F16 can’t really fly at the same pace as a small Cesna. It looks ridiculous though. Slow moving target with a predictable flight path.


I think we/I have some confusion about which cost effectiveness we’re talking about. Your comment is about the cost effectiveness of (Ukraine’s) drone defense, where the defense costs are lower than the attack costs. Ukraine is doing really well on that front to the point that they’re selling tech to other countries.
My comment was about the viability/cost effectiveness of Russian drone launches. For that calculation they need a drone launch price < target value + air defense cost. Since targets tend to be quite valuable, it’s not too hard to make it cost effective, although not necessarily more cost effective than other means.


Of course, ultimately cost limits everything, but it’s not always the biggest factor in the short-ish term. It is easy/cheap to increase drone production in a short time, evident from Russia building a big production site after the war started. It is hard/expensive to increase production for advanced missiles, evident from the relatively low numbers of use and constant-ish rate. They (think they) need long-range strike capabilities and they need it yesterday, so drone usage is the sensible option even if it is more expensive.


I’m not sure if I fully can agree with your argument about cost effectiveness and I think it comes down to accuracy whether it is or isn’t effective.
In the past months 5-10% of Russian drones made it past Ukrainian air defenses (which is impressively low). Let’s go with 5% at a price of $50 000 per drone. That means it costs $1 000 000 per hit target. Missiles are more expensive than that afaik (and a significant percentage of those are taken down too), so the drones don’t do too badly when it comes to cost.
However, if the drones are inaccurate and don’t hit the intended targets, then the cost per target increases rapdidly. It’s hard to say if they’re really cost effective or not, because we don’t know for sure if Russia is actually trying to hit relevant targets or is intentionally commiting to terror strikes v1 style. Ukraine hasn’t been very open about what has been hit, but we do know that their energy infrastructure has taken serious hits.
Another point to consider is that the Russian launch capacity doesn’t appear to be limited by cost, but rather by production capacity (which I suppose is ultimately also limited by cost). That basically means that the drones are almost purely an addition to their arsenal which makes it quite sensible to produce and use more. Fortunately the Russian drones don’t appear to be doing nearly enough to turn the tide in Russia’s favor.


Sturmabteilung, Hitler’s personal storm troopers that helped him rise to power


It was outside of territorial waters but probably inside the economic zone


Regarding the intel/feedback/analytics points, with the technology they use they can get all of that without gamifying the rewards, can’t they?


Buffer zone for Russia, not for NATO


Belarus has said since the start of the war that they won’t send troops, so nothing new. It also makes sense, since they’re both a buffer zone between Russia and NATO, and they’re awfully much in strike range of Ukrainian aerial attacks.


The €70 billion title is misleading. NATO proposes an additional €40 billion, which is still substantial, but not as mucb as the title implies.


That’s super far away! Is that even withing Ukrainian drone range? Or is it maybe from from sabotage or drones launched from outside of Ukraine?


They’re saying two different things in the post. One is that a drone is flown to a location and then automatically attacks whatever it encounters, that’s fully automatic and would be aweful imo because then the drone is making decisions on what to attack/kill.
The second thing is later in the post when they talk about countermeasures. They state that the drones can be countered before they’re locked on to a target. That implies that an operator picks a target and the automation part only serves to keep the drone locked on the target, but the drone makes no decision on what to target. That’s conceptually similar to a pilot selection an enemy aircraft they locked onto before firing a missile.
From the post it’s not quit clear which of the two are the case or if both are happening. I suspect it’s the second case because Ukraine can’t really afford the bad publicity of the first case imo.


This is what it looks like when ‘debris of a shot down drone falls on an industrial area’


And still denying ethnic cleansing


I’m maybe more pessimistic than you, but I think money overrules ethics in many cases. International companies will go back, their investments will be smaller and more careful, but if there’s profit to be made, they will go. Some European countries will go back to Russian gas too, it’s much cheaper, but now infrastructure is in place (and mostly paid off) in case things go sideways again, so there’s less of a risk in buying from Russia. Leasing new aircraft might only happen once they’ve paid off the stolen ones, that’s probably a tough one.


Aha, so it’s mainly for suppression and therefore doesn’t need super high accuracy?


Especially with crappy drone cameras it might be somewhat effective


From the article
It can hit a target 11.6 kilometers away with standard ammunition, or nearly 20 kilometers with extended-range rounds.
Accuracy not specified
What kind of electricity generation is used on the Krim? If Ukraine destroys the powerlines to the mainland, will the Krim go completely dark soon/coming winter?